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We present CHURNs, a method for providing freshness and authentication
assurances to human users. In computer-to-computer protocols, it has long been
accepted that assurances of freshness such as random nonces are required to
prevent replay attacks. Typically no such assurance of freshness is presented to
a human, in a human-and-computer protocol. A Computer-HUman Recognisable
Nonce (CHURN) is a computer-aided random sequence that the human has a
measure of control over and input into. Our approach overcomes limitations such
as “humans cannot do random” and that humans will follow the easiest path. Our
findings show that CHURNs are significantly more random than values produced
by unaided humans; that humans may be used as a second source of randomness
and we give measurements as to how much randomness can be gained from humans
using our approach; and that our CHURN-generator makes the user feel more in
control, thus removing the need for blind trust in devices and underlying protocols.
We give an example of how a CHURN may be used to provide assurances of
freshness and authentication for humans in a widely used protocol.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A common attack on protocols, particularly authenti-
cation protocols, is the replay attack. In this attack,
messages sent between participants in the protocol are
captured by the adversary and stored, to be re-sent at
a later time to the protocol participants. Even if the
messages are encrypted, this replaying attack will work
unless well-known countermeasures are taken, because
the recorded messages are legitimate messages. A typ-
ical countermeasure used in device-to-device protocols
to prevent a replay attack is the inclusion of a value
which can be checked by the recipient to be fresh; this
can be a random nonce, which is a random number used
only once, a timestamp, or a counter.
Commonly used security protocols between comput-
ers, such as HTTPS, use a random nonce to prevent
replay attacks and have done for twenty years [1]. Nev-
ertheless, such measures are still not in place for proto-
cols involving a human, at the human-perceivable level.
Prior to this paper, the concept of a human-created
random nonce has been unknown. Indeed, the most
common human authentication protocols used on the
Internet, such as to log into webmail, banking institu-
tions, or social media, involve the same messages being
sent every time.
While underlying protocols at the device level may
ensure that the messages sent between computers are
unique if the protocol is correctly used, this uniqueness
is neither visible to the human nor does the human
play any part in the decision making process. The
lack of visibility by the human of any freshness measure
means the critical protocol participant, the human, has
no method of discerning whether the protocol messages
they are viewing are fresh, or if the protocol messages
have been previously recorded and are being replayed.
There is thus a need for human perceptible freshness in
protocols. This security quality, though necessary, has
not previously existed. We have filled this gap with the
Computer-HUman Recognisable Nonce (CHURN).
For users without a security background, mechanisms
such as extended validation certificates, HTTPS, and
a padlock icon are ineffective indicators of security
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because the user asks “Who decides?” [2]. That is, who
decides whether the padlock symbol is shown? Many
security researchers have created methods in an attempt
to address this issue. They write about education,
ensuring the human’s mental model is similar to the
program, and creating better security indicators [3–6].
Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
education, mental models, and enhanced security
indicators is beyond the scope of this paper; however,
a useful example to put the security researchers in
the position of the non-security-academic is published
by Shin et al. [7]. They analysed 212 smart phone
applications, of particular interest being the top 30 apps
in the finance category. Their findings show that even
in this finance category, not all of the 22 apps that had
login pages supported the SSL protocol commonly used
to secure communication in a web browser setting. Not
all apps that displayed a security indicator such as a
padlock used an encryption protocol, and not all apps
that were secure displayed a security indicator.
For smart phone apps, there is no controlling program
such as a web browser that decides whether or not to
display security indicators such as a padlock. While
some of the analysed smart phone apps did display a
padlock, this is simply because a designer decided to
put a picture of a padlock on the app, and carries no
guarantee of security. This means that, for the case of
smart phones, even security researchers are in no better
position than users from the general public in discerning
whether an app is secure just by looking at the app.
The question of “Who decides?” for whether security
indicators, such as the padlock symbol, are displayed on
smartphones has an answer which mandates that blind
trust and a total loss of control even for those trained
in information security. This high trust and low control
state from the smartphone example is the same state
the general public finds themselves in for traditional
web browsing protocols such as HTTPS [2]. A CHURN
is an important building block in creating human-and-
device protocols where the security properties, such
as freshness and authentication, are perceptible to the
protocol participants.
1.1. Example Use Case
An example of the use of a human nonce would be in the
Verified-by-Visa protocol. In standard implementations
of this protocol, a user would initially give to Visa a
personal message or passphrase. This message will be
used by Visa to authenticate Visa back to the human
in all future protocol runs. Unfortunately, this phrase
is kept constant. As Dhamija and Tygar write, “The
most obvious weakness of this scheme is that the bank
must display the shared secret in order to authenticate
itself to the user. If the secret is observed or captured,
the image can be replayed until the user notices and
changes it [8].”
To make the Verified-by-Visa protocol resilient
against such replay attacks, our human nonce generator
could be used to create a fresh nonce for the user on each
protocol run. Quite often, the human user does not
explicitly attempt to login to Visa. The human may be
shopping at an online shoe store and once their selection
has been made and they proceed to the checkout, then
the shoe-store redirects the user to Visa for payment.
At this point, the human may ask themselves if they
are interacting with the real Visa, or with an imposter.
Hence, Verified-by-Visa has used the technique of the
repeated pass-phrase in the past.
An example of a modified Verified-by-Visa protocol
may include a nonce instead of the personal message
in the existing protocol. The nonce the human has
picked can be sent to Visa via an out-of-band channel
such as via their bank’s website, since the bank has a
previously-established secure connection to Visa. Visa
would send this nonce back to the human via the
human’s login to Visa. The nonce would be created
freshly on each execution of the protocol and would
require only that the human recognises that the nonce
being sent to them by Visa is the nonce they have
selected in their bank session window. The updated
protocol would both provide protection against replay
attacks and implicitly authenticate Visa to the human.
In this way, the human would have a perceptible
indication of freshness, by both selecting the nonce
and by seeing the nonce come back to them. The
human will be able to see and understand the security
of the protocol. After receiving their nonce from Visa,
the human would still log in via their password to
authenticate.
The need for an indication of freshness in protocols,
to prevent attacks such as replay attacks, is beyond
dispute. The question now becomes “How can a
human create a nonce with cryptographic strength”?
CHURNs are nonces created by humans for use in
security protocols which include a human.
1.2. CHURN Overview
Previous limitations regarding the process of humans
picking their own nonce revolve around the inability
of humans to act randomly. We combine a computer
random number generator with human choices to create
a random sequence that the human has shared control
over. We do this using the computer to pick characters
in a random manner, and present sets of four choices to
the human for the human to pick from. The reason
we added the human element to the nonce creation
process is so that the user gains assurance that the
value is unique and belongs to them, rather than again
relying on blind trust that a random value is in fact
random and non-predictable. The human selects one
character from the set of four characters and this will be
the first character of their CHURN. Next, the human
is presented with another set of four characters, and
makes another choice, and this becomes the second
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character of their CHURN, and so on up to the size
of the CHURN.
A CHURN does not need to be remembered (as per
a password), only compared and recognised. In the
example from Section 1.1, the CHURN selected by the
human and sent to the bank may be kept visible for
comparison with what is sent from Visa to the human.
Thus, a CHURN can be random while in contrast a
password needs to be memorable and hence typically
not random. We employ various design features, such
as moving the location of the choices presented to
the human, to create an output which has random
sequence qualities. Our trial demonstrated that the
tool we have developed is a method for humans to
generate a random sequence to a desired security level,
and demonstrates that the humans are adding a source
of randomness beyond that of the computer’s random
number generator.
A CHURN may be of any length and made up of
any symbols desired by the implementor of the protocol
which employs a CHURN. In our study, CHURNs were
20 symbol sequences of characters from a standard US
keyboard. 20 characters per CHURN was a number of
symbols that traded-off the necessity for a lot of data so
as to be able to conduct meaningful statistical analysis
to provide surety that our method created sequences
with the qualities desired, while being a size small
enough such that when we asked our users to create
three sets of twenty sequences of twenty characters
(1200 characters total per participant) our participants
completed the data entry required of them by our study.
In a concrete implementation of a protocol which used
a CHURN, CHURNs five symbols in length would be
sufficient to give a meaningful assurance of freshness to
a human.
2. BACKGROUND
A number of ingredients are considered when designing
a CHURN generator. We describe nonces and the need
to use them to mitigate replay attacks. We discuss,
from a human point of view, issues of control and the
ability to be random. Finally we will examine the data
analysis methods that present information about the
degree of randomness a specific set of information has.
2.1. Nonces and Replay Attacks
A replay attack is defined as “The adversary records
information seen in the protocol and then sends it to
the same, or a different, principal, possibly during a
later protocol run [9].” It should not be possible to
replay messages from previous protocol runs as valid
messages in the current run of the protocol. To ensure
that replaying does not occur, some assurance of the
freshness of messages, meaning the message is new and
has not been used before, is required. Three traditional
methods used to ensure freshness are random nonces,
timestamps and counters. A random nonce is defined as
“a random value generated by one party and returned to
that party to show that a message is newly generated,”
and critically the value can be used only once [9].
FIGURE 1: 1978 Protocol by Needham and Schroeder
(as shown by Boyd and Mathuria [9]).
As an example of a replay attack, Figure 1 displays
the famous protocol by Needham and Schroeder [10]
as shown in the protocol design book by Boyd and
Mathuria [9]. The symbols used in Figure 1 are defined
as:
S is a trusted third party, which holds long term
keys for communication between S and A, denoted
KAS , and between S and B, denoted KBS .
A, B are entities, possibly with no prior relationship,
who wish to use their existing relationships with S
to establish a new key KAB , which A and B will
use for future communication with each other.
N is a random nonce, that is, a random number used
only once. Therefore, NA is a random nonce
generated by A, and NB is a random nonce
generated by B.
KXY is a secret key between parties X and Y .
The Needham and Schroeder protocol shown in
Figure 1 already made use of a random nonce to ensure
freshness, but only for the messages to party A via
the use of random nonce NA. The lack of a random
nonce from party B led to an attack being discovered
by Denning and Sacco [11]. Message 3 from Figure 1
has no assurance of freshness, that is no random nonce,
timestamp nor counter, and hence an adversary could
replace message 3 with a previously recorded message
3. This would mean that party B would communicate
with an old key K ′AB which the adversary may have
knowledge of. The solution was to include a nonce from
B in the messages.
Timestamps and counters have a common flaw
which requires that protocol participants remain
in synchronization with each other. To achieve
synchronization, usually both a prior and a continuing
relationship are required. Therefore, in Internet-based
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applications where no prior nor continuing relationship
is mandatory, random nonces are most commonly used
to provide freshness assurances to messages.
2.2. Power, Control and Trust
In the world of design, questions of power and control
are significant and a central consideration and focus.
As Bratteteig and Wagner state, “All decisions are a
choice between possibilities, and selecting one of them
and making it concrete as a change in an artefact, is a
demonstration of the capacity to transform, which is a
key aspect of power [12].”
Currently, very little control or power is given to the
users in security protocols. For many users blind trust
is required that their information is secure and that
they are communicating with the party they think they
are communicating with. This lack of power and lack
of control continues beyond the simplest login systems
to more secure two factor security systems that employ
security code generation tokens such as RSA’s SecurID.
In the case of the SecurID protocol, the user presses
a button on a SecurID token which causes the SecurID
token device to display a “random” number. The
generated number can be thought of as a one-time
password that can be traced to a specific token since
each token will have a different seed value used in the
random number generator. Since the RSA server the
user is communicating with has the same seed value
and the same algorithm, then the server can create
the identical “random” number and the two “random”
numbers can be compared for an exact match, thus
authenticating one party to the other. The immediate
user and the company utilising the RSA solution must
trust that the seed for their SecurID Token has not been
compromised, and that the seed is known only to their
token device and to RSA. Of course, there is no way
to guarantee that the seed has not been compromised.
Further, if the seed has been compromised, there may
be no indication of the date and time the compromise
occurred, and hence when all tokens became known to
the adversary remains unknown. Thus, blind trust is
required.
As designers of security systems which humans will
use, we can choose to empower the users of our system
to remove the need for such blind trust. Of course, there
are the usual concerns when using human input, such
as:
 users will make errors of omission [13];
 “user behaviour tends towards the easiest
path” [14];
 ask a user to “write down 100 random decimal
digits, chances are very slim that he will give a
satisfactory result” [15];
 and “computations involved are far beyond the
abilities of most humans” [16].
Traditionally, these concerns have meant that
humans have been partitioned out of the protocol.
Users being excluded from security-critical parts of a
protocol has led to a lack of awareness of whether a
protocol or connection is secure. This lack of awareness,
and lack of any method to discern, whether a protocol
or connection is secure, has led to people creating their
own security measures [2].
2.3. Randomness, Uncertainty and Test Meth-
ods
A seemingly fundamental part of a random nonce,
that allows it to be used as an indication of freshness
in device-to-device protocols, is that the nonce is
random. Perhaps more particularly, the value of the
next nonce must be unpredictable, and hence uncertain,
which includes ensuring that values are not reused.
Our objective was to create a method where humans
can have a decision making role, ideally leading to a
feeling of ownership and empowerment, in the creation
of an unpredictable sequence. We have called that
unpredictable sequence a CHURN, which is to be used
to provide freshness assurances in protocols involving a
human.
Many standard statistical measures that indicate
randomness are inappropriate for assessing the results
of our experiments [17, 18]. The reasons are varied
as to why the standard statistical tests are not useful
in our case, but mainly center around the need for
many data samples and for the samples to be large,
to such an extent that data collection is beyond the
capabilities of a human trial. Statistical packages
widely used for assessing traditional pseudo-random
number generators, such as NIST’s SP800-22rev1a, are
usually focused more on a true-false assessment of the
likelihood that the generated sequence came from a
random source [17]. In our case we need more of
an indication of how random the sequence is, rather
than a true/false assessment of whether the sequence
perfectly resembles a uniformly random sequence. For
this reason, and also because we wanted to run our
analysis at the character level, not at the binary level,
we adapted specific accepted tests for randomness to
our context so that we could compare numerical values
rather than look for a yes/no answer.
For the purposes of assessing how random the
sequences generated by our experiments were, we have
settled on four main tests:
1. Histogram;
2. Entropy;
3. Compressibility; and
4. Hamming Distance.
Histogramming, or frequency analysis, entropy analysis,
and compressibility of the data are also employed in
the suite of statistical tests used by NIST, albeit at the
binary level [17]. The Hamming Distance analysis is
unique to our trial because we can compare multiple
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users against each other. Each assessment method will
now be discussed further.
2.3.1. Histogram
A histogram, or count of the frequencies of each
character, may be used to provide numerical analysis
of a sequence of symbols. A histogram of a sequence
of symbols provides an indication of how uniformly
random a distribution of symbols is, by how smooth
the histogram is. Further, a histogram graph provides
a visual indication of the portion of the alphabet which
has been used. How much of the alphabet is used is
also an indication of randomness. Hence, a sequence of
symbols which contains 40% of the symbols from the
alphabet is seen to have had the symbols selected less
randomly than a sequence of symbols which contains
90% of the symbols from the alphabet.
While providing valuable insight into the randomness
and uncertainty of the created sequences, this test is
limited in that contrived methods, such as sequentially
cycling through the entire alphabet, would be shown to
be perfectly random in so far as the histogram would
be smooth and the entire alphabet would be used.
For the purposes of our experiments, which will be
described in detail in Section 4, we conducted histogram
analysis for single characters, bigrams, trigrams, and
n-grams up to 8 characters in a row which exhausted
all matches. In our experiments, for each experiment
type each participant creates 20 sequences each with 20
symbols in them, meaning each sample is 400 symbols
in length. The alphabet used for the selection of
symbols comprises the keys on a standard US keyboard,
being 10 digits, 26 upper-and lower-case letters, and
32 special characters. Repeating some bigrams is
expected if symbols are selected using a uniform random
distribution, given an alphabet of 94 and a sample
size of 400. However, repeating four characters in
a row is unexpected if the values have been selected
uniformly randomly, and this information will inform
our conclusions regarding how random a sample was.
2.3.2. Entropy
In 1948 Shannon gave us the concept of entropy
in the information theory discrete setting, based on
Boltzman’s H theorem entropy equation [19]. Entropy
is a measure of uncertainty, and increases as uncertainty
is increased. Shannon’s entropy H equation is:
H = −
n∑
i=1
pi log2 pi
where n is the number of elements in a set, and pi
is the probability of that element appearing. For a
given n, H is maximized when all pi are equal, meaning
that all pi = 1/n. As Shannon writes, “This is also
intuitively the most uncertain situation [19],” so higher
entropy values will indicate greater uncertainty. When
the probabilities of all events occurring are equal, H will
equal log2 n. So for a 94 character alphabet, Hmax will
be 6.55459. We estimate the entropy by equating the
probability of each character with its relative frequency
in the samples. We call this the the single character, or
1-gram, entropy. We can also look at the probability
of pairs or triples of characters and estimate the
corresponding 2-gram or 3-gram entropy. For a source
where each character is chosen independently, the n-
gram entropy is exactly n times the 1-gram entropy.
Shannon’s entropy gives a useful measure of
uncertainty when our data is analysed in the single
character setting. Because each sample is 400
characters and the alphabet size is 94, there is at least
a chance that all elements of the alphabet may be used
and hence entropy may be maximized. As soon as
bigrams are examined, the alphabet becomes 942, which
is 8836. This means that our samples cannot achieve a
maximum value for 2-gram and higher entropy, because
not every n-character element in the n-character set can
be present in our samples of 400 characters. Entropy
gives a useful single comparative value for both the
number of symbols used and their relative frequencies.
2.3.3. Compressibility
In general, compression algorithms work by removing
statistical redundancy in the data to be compressed.
As Ziv and Lempel write, “Once the relevant source
parameters have been identified, the problem reduces
to one of minimum-redundancy coding [20].” A data
file which is more compressible must have been more
predictable and hence less uncertain, which provides
a strong indication that the source of the data was
less random. Since various compression algorithms look
for patterns and repeated sequences, this mitigates the
concern that non-random patterns may not be detected
by histogram and entropy analysis. Further, the level
of compression gives an indication of how random, not
just whether a sequence is random.
To give insight into how compression tools work, an
example compression tool may be thought of as having
three parts: a model structure for contexts and events,
a statistics unit for estimation of the event statistics,
and an encoder for the events [21]. This is sometimes
summarized to a model and an encoder. Improvements
to the model lead to better compression effectiveness,
while improvements to the encoder tend to lead to
better compression efficiency [22].
We picked three compression tools, which use
three different underlying approaches, to illustrate the
uncertainty of the output from our trials. Firstly, an
arithmetic encoder by Moffat, Neal and Witten [22]
was used. Arithmetic encoders have history that
started with Shannon, and ideally meet the entropy
compression bound [21]. This means that if the single
character entropy of a file was 5.8 of a maximum 6.5,
then ideally the file compresses down to 89.2% of its
original size, if the model used was a single character
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model. We used a single character model.
Our second compression tool was gzip. Gzip is
a widely used and accepted compression tool. Gzip
employs a variation of the LZ77 dictionary coding
algorithm [20] which replaces repeated occurrences of
duplicated strings with a pointer to the first string to
create the set of literals and match lengths.
Our third compression tool was bzip2, a compression
tool that uses the Burrows-Wheeler transform. By
selecting three compression algorithms we have a
greater certainty of detecting any pattern, which may
have been a shortfall of the histogram or entropy
analysis.
2.3.4. Hamming Distance
Hamming described the distance between two code
points D(x, y) as being the number of coordinates for
which x and y are different [23]. This distance is referred
to as the Hamming distance. As an example, the
distance between any two of the following code points
is 2 (that is, two changes are required to move from any
3 digit code to another) [23]:
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
The Hamming distance is used to measure the number
of differences between two sequences of equal length. So
if two 20 character sequences are compared, the greatest
Hamming distance possible is 20 (meaning the two
sequences of characters have no common characters in
the same position in both sequences) and the minimum
Hamming distance is 0 (meaning the two sequences are
exactly equal to each other and hence there are no
differences).
3. DEVELOPED PROGRAM
Based on our prior human trials and the knowledge we
have gained from others’ research, there was a number
of critical design decisions made in the development
of our prototype CHURN-creation program. These
include symbols and alphabet used, displaying choices,
random choice locations, and constraining the user,
which we will now discuss further.
3.1. Symbol Alphabets Used
The size of an alphabet is one of the adjustable
security level variables available with a CHURN. The
symbols in the CHURN alphabet must simply be able
to be recognized by users. As such, playing cards
and Mahjong tiles are just two possibilities to use
as alphabets for the human user to draw from, and
alphabets may be adjusted for specific cultures or
organizations. The alphabet size is critical, because if
there are twenty symbols in the CHURN then, before
any further processing or considerations (discussed
further below), there are α20 combinations possible
where α is the size of the alphabet.
Because we wanted to have a baseline to compare
the output of our CHURN-generator with, we used the
keys available on a standard keyboard. That is, we used
humans typing randomly on a keyboard as our baseline
for un-assisted human randomness. Rather than tell
participants in our study that they cannot use parts
of the keyboard, we permitted every key. There were
other analysis advantages, since each character used was
a single byte. So we used all digits, upper- and lower-
case letters and special characters from a standard US
keyboard. That is, the alphabets we used were:
0123456789
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
~!@#$%^&*()_+-={}|[]\:";’<>?,./‘
As such, there were ten digits, twenty-six lower case
alphabetic characters, twenty-six upper case alphabetic
characters, and thirty-two special characters, giving a
total alphabet size of 94 characters. For a 20 character
sequence, this is 9420 possibilities.
It should be clear that different alphabets may be
used together. This means that the set of 52 playing
cards could be added to this 94 character alphabet to
create a combined alphabet of 146 characters. This
would mean that there are 146 choices for each symbol
position, and for 20 symbols there would be 14620
combinations possible.
3.2. Displaying Choices
Our general technique to provide computer-aided
random sequence generation from a user is to use
a computer-based random generator to create a set
of choices for the human to pick from. We did
this to overcome Knuth’s observation that humans
are typically unable to create a random sequence
themselves [15].
There are two major effects of presenting random
choices for the human to choose from. The first effect
is that the human is restricted to choices that are
as random as the computer pseudorandom number
generator used can create. The second effect is that
then the human adds a second source of randomness
by making a choice. One of the main focuses of our
trial is identifying whether humans will act as a second
source of randomness, and, if they are a second source
of randomness, “how random” the human will be (see
Section 5.6). A significant benefit of our design is that
the adversary always needs to guess which of the values
the human will have selected in each position. This is
true even if the computer’s random number generator’s
seed value and algorithm are known by an adversary
such that what choices are presented to the user are
known. Since each CHURN is used only once, the
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adversary has one chance to correctly guess the series
of human choices.
We settled on four choices presented to the user at
any one time for the user to make a selection from. Four
choices may be represented by 2 bits. This means that
up to 2 bits of security comes from the human choices
for every character in their generated CHURN, and as
such, this is another security parameter variable. Easily
adjustable security variables for a CHURN include the
number of symbols in an alphabet, the number of
choices presented to the human for each character of
the CHURN, and the length of the CHURN. At four
choices per character and twenty character positions,
for our trial we had a potential 40 bits of security from
the human choices.
3.3. Random Choice Locations
As is clearly understood in the security literature,
“user behaviour tends towards the easiest path [14].”
A CHURN is not meant to be used as a password.
Passwords are meant to be memorable, while, in
contrast, CHURNs are meant to be recognised and
used by comparison only once to ensure freshness.
Our approach forces randomness onto the human
user, while still providing the user with choice and
control. To highlight how different our approach is,
some useful comparisons can be made with computer-
assisted password generators. For example there is a
computer assisted password generator here: http://
www.generatepasswordfree.com/. On this password
generator, the user clicks on a background of “random”
characters and generates their random somehow-
memorable password. With such a technique, there
is nothing to stop the user leaving the mouse in the
same place and clicking the same letter every time,
thus constructing a password of “GGGGGGGGG” for
example. The user is not forced to move the mouse or
to move the mouse in any sort of random fashion, and
thus there is no assurance that the constructed output
is random at all.
In contrast, by displaying the four choices in random
locations, we force the user to move and to make a
separate choice of which symbol to pick and where to
move to each time. As one of our participants of the
trial stated, “I like how you move the buttons around.
If the button didn’t move I would be tempted to sit
on the same button and keep clicking it.” We move
the position of our four choices which are presented to
the user randomly both on the X and Y axis inside
a rectangular area for each choice. The restriction we
place on the position of the choices is that the choices
cannot overlap each other. As an example of how the
buttons move and do not overlap, see Figure 4.
3.4. Constraining the User
Displaying multiple choices for the user to pick from,
particularly when there are sub-alphabets such as digits
and lowercase letters involved, means that a user’s
preferences in their decision making may significantly
reduce the randomness and security of the output. For
example, since there are 32 special characters in the
alphabet of 94 characters, if four random choices from
the 94 character alphabet are presented to to the user
to choose from for each CHURN character position, one
of the four choices will be a special character a high
percentage of the time. If the user has a preference
to special characters, she may be able to restrict the
output from being 94 possible characters per CHURN
character position down to the 32 possible special
characters for each of the CHURN characters. Indeed,
in the part of our trial where we did not constrain the
choices presented to our participants, one participant
said, “Oh no! I wanted to create a string without
any alphabet characters and I was forced to pick a
character.” For a twenty character sequence, reducing
from 9420 to 3220 reduces the number of possibilities
to a very small fraction of 1% of the initial problem
space. Without any constraint, such subversion may
be possible either deliberately or due to unconscious
preference.
Decomposition of the number of characters in each
sequence via a weighted decision tree as per Shannon,
yields that for a 20 character sequence with digit
probability of 10/94, lowercase probability of 26/94,
uppercase probability of 26/94 and special character
probability of 32/94, there should be two digits, six
lowercase, five uppercase, and seven special characters.
Each sequence having this mix of characters is non-
ideal because lowercase and uppercase have the same
number of symbols in their respective sub-alphabets,
and yet lowercase has been allocated six characters
while uppercase has five. However, restricting the
user such that each sequence has this combination of
characters prevents various forms of undermining the
method for creating a CHURN.
Consider a five-character example of how we enforced
this constraint on the users. In the example there
will be one digit, one lowercase character, one upper
case character, and two special characters. Firstly
we created four fresh sequences each five characters in
length, because four is the number of choices presented
at once to a user. These sequences had in the first
position a random digit, second position a random
lowercase character, third position a random uppercase
character and in the fourth and fifth positions random
special characters. The example four sequences are
shown in Table 1.
Secondly, we created a fresh single random permuta-
tion for this set of four sequences. For example, a ran-
dom permutation of positions 1,2,3,4,5 may be 3,5,2,1,4.
Finally we rearranged each of the four sequences using
the same permutation, such that the “digit” is in the
same location in all four sequences. The result of ap-
plying the permutation 3,5,2,1,4 to all sequences from
Table 1 is shown in Table 2.
The Computer Journal, Vol. ??, No. ??, ????
8 K. Radke, C. Boyd, J. Gonzalez Nieto and H. Bartlett
TABLE 1: Random characters in fixed positions in sequences.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4 Position 5
Sequence 1 6 r W # [
Sequence 2 4 t E ; =
Sequence 3 1 e F > ?
Sequence 4 6 c B \ -
TABLE 2: Random characters in the same-across-sequence random positions.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4 Position 5
Sequence 1 W [ r 6 #
Sequence 2 E = t 4 ;
Sequence 3 F ? e 1 >
Sequence 4 B - c 6 \
Now, the user of our CHURN-creator will be
presented with the choices from the first position of
all four sequences first. That is, referring to Table 2,
the user will be asked to pick between “W”, “E”, “F”
and B”. Once they have made that choice, they will be
presented with the choices from the second position of
all four sequences. That is they will be asked to pick
from “[”, “=”, “?”, and “-”, and so on.
In this way, each sequence is guaranteed to have
random characters in random positions, but a fixed
number of each character type per sequence. By
way of illustration, Figure 2 shows an example twenty
sequence output created by one of the participants.
Note that while each 20-character sequence has exactly
two digits, five uppercase, six lowercase, and seven
special characters, the order that the different sub-
alphabets appear in each of the sequences are different.
vO3f;Hw{x+OrK2h>$.[C
U=8w(S‘,5^-WQkyyGqk‘
hhjpN+7F5$?L/Y{‘kJa[
vhl0LQl^:3@FxPH’|k)]
93w#X}y\e~D[Qu|%IdQb
owc>Pv&3J=0ZY.V%g@j;
5saMrXI’cV,}?’mGu,?1
/#$3IY(idF\tc#b=KJ1r
LYr?iJqdf#_.!45_aVC,
p?WZyLN)l0$D(/1&g+mf
4uU;bo*Mf(V1E?%w*E[x
_tR;"c(I_KF{w_c0vf7L
f!4lDe)bWR+rNIf+_#*0
6pZi?wMo}}-W5|~‘pLnJ
9er9K‘=Q\jy@N:CI~z$v
Q}kmPm*SRp7\?K5f:{\k
3!omk\H’(5Rb~;R+hPXw
W9L{-8B~dNqFo"hka:’=
T(hb&P-+@sG_mL4W_7yf
%k0hqE(|\:+2ANrVT<xl
FIGURE 2: Example twenty sequence constrained
output
Such a constraint reduces the number of possible
sequences generated. For an alphabet of 94 characters,
20 characters per sequence means
9420 ≈ 2.90× 1039
possible combinations. Using our constrained method,
the number of possible outcomes becomes
102
2!
× 26
6
6!
× 26
5
5!
× 32
7
7!
× (20!) ≈ 3.52× 1037.
This is a reduction by a factor of approximately 100, or
reduced by 1.2%. The reason the constrained version
reduces is because there is no distinction between
multiple characters from a sub alphabet. For example,
consider the case where two identical digits appear
somewhere in the 20 character sequence. That is, if the
first of the two digits is a “5” and that is permutated to
sequence position 1, this will result in the same set of
possible combinations as when the second digit is also
a “5” and the second digit is permutated to sequence
position 1.
We used the inbuilt Random class in C# as our
random generator. The underlying random generator
can be replaced. Using the one method consistently
to create random numbers in all our tests allowed for
comparison between tests. Prior to conducting the
trial with our participants, we generated sequences
of 5,040,000 characters using both constrained and
unconstrained methods and analysed and compared the
results to discern the difference that our constraints
made to the randomness of the values being presented
to the participants. The single character entropy
values were very similar: 6.55457 for the unconstrained
sequence versus 6.55431 for the constrained sequence.
This similarity was repeated through each of the n-
gram tests, from 2-gram through to 8-gram. For
example, subsequences in the unconstrained set had
eleven more six-character sequences used out of the
possible 689,869,781,056 six-character sequences, than
the constrained set. It should be noted that
even a 5,040,000 character sample is too small for
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conclusive analysis at anything higher than three
character positions for entropy. The 3-gram entropy
for the unconstrained sequence was 19.541 and for our
constrained sequence it was 19.515, out of a maximum
of 19.664.
4. TEST SETUP AND HYPOTHESES
Our goal is to compare a CHURN-generator, which
is the constrained graphical version presented in
this paper, with how random humans can be when
unassisted. Our hypotheses were:
H11: Sequences created by humans using our CHURN-
generator would be significantly more random than
sequences created by humans without the aid of a
CHURN-generator.
H21: There will be a significant second source of
randomness due to the human input to a CHURN-
generator.
To investigate these hypotheses we asked the partici-
pants to complete four tasks: keyboard entry, mouse
entry unconstrained, mouse entry constrained, and a
small questionnaire at the end. In each task, for the
purposes of gaining the most data possible from our
participants, all sequences in our tests were 20 charac-
ters long. However, in a commercial implementation of
a CHURN, a useful indication of freshness would occur
using just five characters. We will now discuss the tasks
performed by each participant further.
4.1. Keyboard Entry
To compare how random an unassisted human can
be we needed an unassisted human baseline for each
participant, so we asked each participant to type in 20
sequences of 20 characters as randomly as they could
using a keyboard. The entry form from our prototype
is shown in Figure 3.
Before each keyboard entry trial we outlined to each
participant what the usable keys were by pointing to
them individually as we said them, particularly for the
special characters. The range of possible keys to be used
equated to every key on four rows of a US keyboard
with the exception of the Enter key and the Tab key.
Participants were also told not to use the spacebar.
As users entered their sequence they could see what
they had typed in that sequence. As soon as the 20
character sequence was completed, it was hidden from
the user’s view while other sequences were completed
to contribute to the sequences being distinct from each
other. This had the effect of not allowing participants
to return to earlier sequences and adjust them. Once all
20 sequences were complete, all sequences were revealed
to the participants in a non-editable form and the
sequences were saved to file.
FIGURE 3: Participant keyboard input form.
4.2. Mouse Entry Unconstrained
Keyboard entry was unconstrained in that each
participant was not forced to have any set number
of elements from any sub-alphabet. For example,
a sequence of twenty characters generated from the
keyboard could have been all digits. Our CHURN-
generator is constrained such that all twenty character
sequences are guaranteed to have a set number of
characters from each of the sub-alphabets. As a
step between the unconstrained keyboard and the
constrained mouse entry, we used unconstrained mouse
entry.
In the case of unconstrained mouse entry, users were
presented with a window, approximately the size of a
smart phone, with four options to pick from by clicking
with a mouse. The four options were at locations which
had been generated randomly, and each option’s value
had been generated randomly from the alphabet of
94 characters without constraints such as “all choices
shown at a time must be of the same sub-alphabet”.
The process is shown in Figure 4.
As may be seen in the left picture of Figure 4, the first
four choices presented to users were z S b and ]. The
user in Figure 4 selected S, which took the user to the
middle screen with S shown as selected at the bottom
in “Your values” and a second set of four choices was
presented. This second set of four choices contained
7 t * and g. The user selected g which moved them
to the third screen in Figure 4 which has S g as the
selected partial sequence, and another choice of four
characters being J ˜ and H. In this way 20 sequences
of 20 characters were constructed using selections made
using a mouse by each participant.
As a secondary capability of this test, even though the
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FIGURE 4: Unconstrained mouse entry form.
TABLE 3: Hamming distance example from first
sequence.
Participant First Sequence
A b7JEzL<+KgZ~es4sK‘C#
B ]tJESL.??C;f8s:sgZ4q
positions of the choices and the choices themselves were
generated randomly, they were generated randomly
and saved. At which point all our participants were
shown the exact same four choices in the exact same
position for all 20 choices per 20 sequences for the test.
This allows us to do is to examine how random the
users’ choices were. Each trial participant would select
from the same four choices in the same four positions
as every other participant to construct a sequence.
Then, each participant’s sequence could be compared
to every other participant’s corresponding sequence
using the Hamming distance. The first sequence for
two participants is shown in Table 3 to illustrate the
concept.
Table 3 shows two twenty character sequences with
five matches between the two sequences coloured in
red. With reference to Figure 4, the two participants in
Table 3 selected from z S b and ] for the first character,
and Participant A selected b while Participant B
selected ]. Similarly, for the second character choice
both participants were presented with 7 t * and g and
Participant A selected 7 while Participant B selected t.
On the third character choice, both participants were
presented with the four choices of J ˜ and H and both
participants selected the same option, J. The Hamming
distance between such sequences will be used in Sections
5.5 and 5.6 to quantify the second source of randomness
provided by the human user making choices.
4.3. Mouse Entry Constrained
As outlined in Section 3.4, our CHURN-generator is
constrained to reduce the user’s ability to minimize
the alphabet size used. Therefore our third test is a
test which shows how the CHURN-generator works,
specifically with a constrained range of choices and
with each participant being shown fresh random choices
each time. How the CHURN-generator is constrained
is illustrated in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5: Constrained mouse entry form.
The left picture in Figure 5 shows four choices that
are presented to the user, and they are constrained
such that all choices are lower case alphabetical. The
right picture in Figure 5 shows a second set of choices
presented to the user, the user having selected m to
move to the right hand picture, and now the choices
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are constrained such that they are all digits. One
participant’s output of the constrained mouse entry
method is shown in Figure 2.
4.4. Questionnaire
At the end of the data entry, each participant was
asked to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire
mainly had demographic questions such as age, gender,
and education level. The final three questions were
particular to our study and they asked:
 How many times a week do they use an
authentication protocol to access a website on
the Internet? Specifically, banking, e-commerce,
Facebook, and webmail were mentioned.
 Compared with getting a random sequence of
characters given to them by a bank, how in control
of their random sequence did they feel when they
were allowed to pick each position in the sequence
from a set of four choices, as per the mouse entry
methods?
 Comparing their keyboard entry and the computer-
assisted mouse entry, which did the users feel
resulted in a more random sequence being
generated?
4.5. Ethics
Permission was gained from our university’s Human
Ethics committee for this trial. Risks were minimal
compared with every day computer usage or compared
with playing a computer game. All participants signed
a consent form prior to taking part and were able to
leave at any time. All participants completed the trial.
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We separate the analysis of our results into the
following areas: participant analysis; the human side
to randomness; histograms; entropy; compression tools;
and Hamming distance. We will discuss each area
further now.
5.1. Participant Analysis
Fifty participants took part in and completed our trial.
While common criticisms of academic security trials are
that the vast majority of the participants are university
educated, male, and in the 18–25 year old age bracket,
we managed to secure a range of participants to take
part in our study. The analysis of our participants is
presented here.
5.1.1. Age, Gender, and Qualifications
More than a third of our participants were female
(19), and approximately a third had no university
qualification and were not current university students
(16). The age ranges of the participants are shown in
Figure 6.
FIGURE 6: Histogram of participant ages.
5.1.2. Logins per week
Each login secured with a password to a website on
the Internet is an example of where a CHURN could
be used to enhance security. The number of times a
week that participants would log into a website such
as banking, e-commerce, Facebook or webmail using a
password ranged from three participants answering zero
times, through to a participant reporting 140 logins per
week. The distribution of the number of logins a week
per participant is shown in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7: Histogram of logins per week.
5.1.3. Feeling in Control
A critical part of secure human protocol design is
to empower the user and make them feel as though
they are in control. More than two thirds of our
participants reported feeling more in control using the
CHURN-generator to create a random sequence than
being given a random sequence to use by a computer.
Five participants reported feeling less in control. A
participant stated:
“The reason I would like to choose my own
random numbers rather than be given them
by the bank is because there is less chance of
someone else having them.”
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5.2. The Human Side to Randomness
There are two general observations to make about
human randomness. Firstly, that humans cannot make
uniformly random choices and secondly that humans
will see patterns in uniformly random things, such
that they will think that something that is uniformly
random is not uniformly random. This ability to detect
patterns, and to presume that patterns indicates non-
randomness, typically leads to humans not picking two
digits the same in a row when asked to write random
digits down, even though approximately one in every
10 digits should be the same as its predecessor when
selected at random [15].
Two examples of verbal responses from participants
as they used the unconstrained mouse entry form were:
“There does not seem to be enough numbers.
It makes me want to pick numbers.”
“. . . I picked a capital last time, so I’m trying
not to pick a capital this time.”
A further consideration is that humans may repeat
a certain character more often than others. While this
behaviour is restricted in both the mouse constrained
and mouse unconstrained sequence generation methods
employed in the trial, we had a participant state while
using the unconstrained mouse entry method, “Let’s
try finding an ‘A’ and always click an ‘A’.” Therefore
humans can err on the side of not being random due to
too much repetition; as well as erring on the side of not
enough repetition, unless a CHURN is constrained to
minimize such behaviour.
As the final question on the questionnaire that
all participants completed as part of the trial,
participants were asked to compare the randomness of
the sequences they generated by themselves compared
with the randomness of the sequences they created
via the CHURN generator. More than a third
of the participants thought that the sequences they
created unaided were more random than the sequences
generated by the CHURN generator. The analysis of
the results of the randomness and uncertainty tests on
the aided sequences and the sequences generated by the
CHURN generator are presented in Sections 5.3 to 5.5.
5.3. Histograms
An illustrative example of the range of values used by
each participant in the different tests is a histogram.
We will first discuss single character frequencies, then
n-gram frequencies.
5.3.1. Single character histograms
For the purposes of the single character frequencies, the
characters used in each of the twenty sequences are
combined for each participant. The single character
histogram for each participant for both the human-
unassisted keyboard and CHURN-generator are shown
in Figure 8.
The data in Figure 8 is not meant to be readable on
a per-participant or per-character basis. In particular,
on the x-axis only every second character is labelled,
even though all values are presented. However, two
observations are clearly noticeable.
Firstly, no participant used all characters from
the available alphabet of 94 characters in the un-
assisted human keyboard input test. Indeed, the
maximum number of characters from the alphabet of 94
possible characters used by any of the fifty participants
when they used the keyboard input was 84. The
mean number of characters used was 59.4 and the
minimum was 23. In contrast, in the computer assisted
CHURN output shown in Figure 8, eighteen of the
fifty participants used all 94 characters available in
the alphabet, the lowest number of characters used
by any participant using CHURN was 90 and the
mean was 92.82. The minimum number of characters
used via CHURN being six characters more than the
maximum number of characters used by any unassisted
participant, is clear supportive evidence that CHURN
gives more random output.
The second critical observation to be made of Figure 8
is with regards to the y-axis. Note the different scales on
the two histograms. In the unassisted human keyboard
creation of random sequences, many participants used
the same character a significant number of times.
Specifically, exactly half the fifty participants used
one of the characters from the 94 character alphabet
thirty or more times in their random keyboard entry
sequences. Thirty or more times, out of 400 characters,
means that 7.5% or more of the output was the one
character for half the participants. In contrast, the
most any one character was used by any participant
when using the CHURN-generator was 14 times. There
were four participants who selected the same character
14 times when using the CHURN generator. Again,
maximum usage of individual characters is a strong
indicator that the computer-assisted human, using
the CHURN-generator, produces a significantly more
random and unpredictable output than an unassisted
human can.
5.3.2. N-gram histograms
The process for analysing the sequences in an n-gram
fashion was to look at non-overlapping n-grams inside
each sequence. This means two things. Firstly, if
bigrams (two character sequences) are considered, then
there are ten bigrams per sequence, and 200 bigrams
per participant. This ensures independence between
bigrams. Secondly, a 5-gram could not start in one
sequence and end in another, though this would not
occur because five is a divisor of twenty. In this way we
keep the sequences distinct.
A repeat of four character sequence is very significant.
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FIGURE 8: Histogram of single character usage per participant via a keyboard and CHURN-generator.
Each 4-gram should appear every 944 4-grams on
average. That is, every 78, 074, 896 × 4 characters, or
every 312, 299, 584 characters. Using the unassisted
keyboard input, fifteen participants had at least one
4-gram repeat in their twenty sequences of twenty
characters (400 characters total) generated. Two
participants had at least one 8-gram repeat in their
unassisted keyboard input. If this was occurring
uniformly randomly, an 8-gram should repeat on
average every 948 = 6, 095, 689, 385, 410, 816 8-grams.
Using the unassisted keyboard input, forty partic-
ipants had 3-gram repeats. In contrast, using the
CHURN-generator, not one participant had a 3-gram
repeat. A 3-gram should occur on average every 943 =
830, 584 3-grams.
5.4. Compression Tools
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, compression tools are
based on a variety of underlying algorithms. As
such, we have settled on three compression tools: an
arithmetic encoder described by Moffat et al. [22]; gzip;
and bzip2. The smaller the compressed file the less
random and less uncertain the original uncompressed
file was; and similarly larger files indicate more random
and greater uncertainty. All input files were the same
size.
The compressed file sizes for each participant are
presented in Figure 9 for the arithmetic encoder,
in Figure 10 for gzip, and in Figure 11 for
bzip2. At all times the unassisted-human keyboard
output compressed to a smaller size than both
the unconstrained and constrained computer-assisted
mouse output. Keyboard output always being smaller
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than CHURN-generator output, for every participant
and for all three compression tools, is a strong indicator
that the CHURN-generator creates a more random and
unpredictable sequence than an unassisted human can
produce.
FIGURE 9: Arithmetic compression of participant’s
keyboard, unconstrained mouse, and CHURN genera-
tion output.
FIGURE 10: gzip compression of participant’s key-
board, unconstrained mouse, and CHURN generation
output.
Of interest is that for the same files compressed
using the three different tools, some tools compressed
the CHURN generator’s output to be larger than the
unconstrained mouse output, while other tools had
the unconstrained mouse output’s compressed file as
larger than the CHURN generator’s compressed file. By
compression tool:
 the arithmetic encoder compressed the CHURN
generator’s output to a larger file size than the
unconstrained mouse’s compressed output for 23
participants (just under half)
 the gzip compression tool compressed the CHURN
generator’s output to a larger file size than the
unconstrained mouse’s compressed output for 30
participants ( 3/5)
FIGURE 11: bzip2 compression of participant’s key-
board, unconstrained mouse, and CHURN generation
output.
 the bzip2 compression tool compressed the
CHURN generator’s output to a larger file size than
the unconstrained mouse’s compressed output for
33 participants ( 2/3)
Compression of files is very algorithm- and
implementation- specific, and will give different results
for different files. As such, significant conclusions can-
not be drawn from the values of “which output type
creates a larger file” for the mouse unconstrained and
CHURN methods, particularly because the differences
between the files in many cases are less than 10 bytes
(about 2.7%). The conclusion to draw from these re-
sults comparing the CHURN generator’s output with
the unconstrained mouse output, is that with sequences
of 400 characters the constraints placed in CHURN do
not significantly (or even noticeably) decrease the ran-
domness of sequences compared with an unconstrained
solution. Since the constraints offer significant protec-
tion against reduction of the full alphabet to a much
smaller alphabet, the CHURN creation method which
includes constraints is recommended.
Our conclusions are based on statistical analysis. As
an example, to test that CHURN-generator output
creates a larger, and hence more random, compressed
file using the arithmetic encoder than a compressed
keyboard output file, we used the following null
hypothesis:
H0: The mean compressed file size for the keyboard
entry files and the mouse entry files are the same.
First we calculated the differences between the
compressed file sizes for the keyboard and CHURN-
generator files for the arithmetic encoder. We then
completed some statistical analysis on these difference
values. The mean was 46.46 bytes. The variance was
399.36 bytes. The standard deviation was 19.98 bytes.
Given our 50 samples, our margin of error was 2.826
bytes. For 49 degrees of freedom and a 95% confidence
interval, our T-statistic is 2.009575. Using the T-
statistic multiplied by our margin of error gave us a
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95% confidence interval of 40.78 − 52.14 bytes for the
arithmetic compression tool.
These tests were repeated for the bzip and gzip
compression methods. The 95% confidence interval for
bzip was 66.60 − 86.66 bytes, and the 95% confidence
interval for gzip was 44.47− 60.09 bytes.
Because our confidence intervals do not include 0,
we rejected H0 thus concluding that the CHURN-
generated files do create larger, and hence more random,
compressed files.
Further, we applied similar paired T-Tests for the
comparison between the constrained and unconstrained
versions, to ascertain if there was any noticable
difference in the compressed file sizes. Ideally, there
will be little or no difference in the file sizes. This
means that the constraints we put in place, to
protect against users deliberately undermining of the
random generation process, do not protect at a cost
of significantly reducing the randomness of the output.
The 95% confidence interval for the arithmetic, bzip
and gzip compression tools were, respectively, −1.4 to
−0.12 bytes, −0.95 to 3.3 bytes and 0.49 to 0.81 bytes.
Since these confidence intervals include or are very close
to zero, there is little supportive evidence of a systemic
difference between the constrained and unconstrained
methods.
5.5. Hamming Distance
We applied Hamming distance calculations to the
mouse unconstrained data to ascertain the variation
that humans were adding to the process. We could do
this because all participants saw the same four choices
in the same four locations, for every set of four character
choices in their twenty sequences of twenty characters.
Returning to the two example sequences shown in
Table 3, and remembering that the first three choices
were made from the choices shown in Figure 4, the
Hamming distance for the two sequences is 20 − 5 =
15. Each participant’s responses may be compared in
this way with every other participant’s responses, for
each of the twenty sequences. For fifty participants,
50× 50 = 2500 comparisons per 20 character sequence.
We remove 50 comparisons from the 2500 comparisons
because for each participant one comparison would
be with themselves, leaving 2450 comparisons. Since
participant A compared with participant B is the
same as participant B compared with participant A,
we divide by two to get the number of unique-pair
comparisons, which is 1225 unique-pair comparisons per
twenty character sequence. This gives significant data
for comparison with a binomial distribution, which the
distribution of Hamming distances for unique pairs will
have, if the participants are choosing uniformly from a
random distribution.
If the selections made by each participant when they
are selecting from the four choices presented to them fol-
low a normal random distribution, then the Hamming
distances between each of the participants’ correspond-
ing sequences should be a Binomial distribution.
Since four choices were presented to the participants
to select from, we used a probability of 0.75. That is, for
each four-choice character position the probability of a
match is 1/4 or 0.25, and the probability of a mismatch
and hence +1 to the Hamming distance is 0.75. Based
on a probability of 0.75, and 1225 unique pairings, the
expected values for the Hamming distances for each of
the twenty sequences of twenty characters is shown in
Table 4.
The observed values for the Hamming distances for
each of the twenty sequences are shown in Figure 12,
along with the ideal curve from Table 4. While the
observed Hamming distance values from Figure 12 do
resemble the expected values shown in Table 4, the
graphs for the recorded values from our study have
been skewed to the left of the ideal curve. So while
humans are contributing a source of randomness, the
full 2 bits of security is not gained from each character
position in the CHURN sequence. Extremely promising
is the fact that out of 1225 comparisons for 20 sequences
(24,500 comparisons), no two participants created the
same sequence despite being given the same choices
in the same positions. Our study represented trying
conditions where 800 mouse clicks were required from
participants in a row, suggesting that participants
started to tend towards the easiest path possible and
“click on the nearest value”. 50 participants and four
choices per position means that at least 13 participants
started on the same first value of the 20th sequence, and
even so, for the 20th sequence there was only one pair
with the smallest Hamming distance of four, out of 1225
20th sequence comparisons.
5.6. “Who Decides?”
As described in Section 1, there is the question asked
by human users in security ceremonies of who decides?
Who decides which part of the browser (or application)
can be changed by a developer, and which parts are
fixed by the web browser? Who decides whether
HTTPS is shown in the address bar of a web browser;
if a padlock is shown in the status bar or address
bar; if the address bar is a certain colour? As
stated at the beginning of this paper, this question
of “who decides” is of further concern in the case of
smart phone applications, where the answer is “the
application developer decides on an individual basis,”
thus necessitating blind trust.
The answer to the question “Who decides” in the
case of a CHURN is the human; at least partially.
This goes beyond simply feeling in control, which is
also important and which two-thirds of our participants
stated they felt, as described in Section 5.1.3. For
each character position, the humans are making choices,
choosing between four symbols presented to them in
random locations. If humans made the selection of
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TABLE 4: Binomial distribution of Hamming distances based on 1225 pairs and probability of 0.75.
Hamming distance Binomial probability Expected number of unique pairs
with this Hamming distance
0 9.095E-13 1.11E-09
1 5.457E-11 6.68E-08
2 1.555E-09 1.91E-06
3 2.799E-08 3.43E-05
4 3.569E-07 4.37E-04
5 3.426E-06 0.004
6 2.570E-05 0.031
7 1.542E-04 0.189
8 7.517E-04 0.921
9 3.007E-03 3.68
10 9.922E-03 12.15
11 0.027 33.15
12 0.061 74.59
13 0.112 137.70
14 0.169 206.55
15 0.202 247.86
16 0.190 232.36
17 0.134 164.02
18 0.067 82.01
19 0.021 25.90
20 3.171E-03 3.88
FIGURE 12: Observed Hamming distances for participant pairs for each of the twenty sequences.
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a symbol perfectly randomly, this would mean the
probability of selecting a particular choice would be
0.25, and that each of the twenty sequences presented
in Figure 12 would approximate a binomial distribution
with a centre at 15 (that is, 0.75 of 20 possible matches
for Hamming distance).
So far we have used compression tools and other
methods to approximate how random the overall
sequence created is. Now we can go a step further.
Using the values created from the mouse unconstrained
data, we can analyse just the human contribution to
randomness. We can do this because all participants
saw the same four choices in the same four locations
for every set of four character choices in their twenty
sequences of twenty characters. We have completed
the Hamming distance analysis on those choices in
Section 5.5.
By changing the binomial probability from the ideal
value of 0.75, which it should be for Hamming distance
if 1 value was chosen uniformaly randomly from 4, to
lower values, we can match a binomial probability curve
to the data acquired from our tests, on a per-sequence
basis. When the constructed binomial curve results in
a Chi-Squared test showing a probability of at least 0.5
that the values from the actual Hamming distance curve
for a sequence came from that binomial distribution,
we will have a good approximation for the binomial
probability for our actual data.
To acquire these best-match binomial values, we used
the unconstrained nonlinear optimization fminsearch
function in Matlab. The fminsearch function takes a
function as its parameter. Looking at the curves in
Figure 12 we can see that the peaks of the curves are at
approximately 13, or a probability of 0.65. Therefore,
in the function supplied to fminsearch we stepped
through probability p values from 0.5 to 0.8, with a
step size of 0.001 and calculated this calculation at each
probability:
1225∑
i=1
ln
(
20
yi
)
+ yi ln p+ (20− yi) ln(1− p)
where yi is each of the 1225 Hamming distance values.
As a graphical example of the process, we show in
Figure 13 a graph of the 1225 participant comparisons
for Sequence 8 from Figure 12. As can be seen in
Figure 12, Sequence 8 is our worst case from our twenty
sequences. Sequence 8 is the curve furthest to the left,
meaning its probability of a mismatch is lowest. By
applying the fminsearch function in the range 0.5 to
0.8, a probability o 0.6271 was indentified as being the
best fit for the curve for Sequence 8. Figure 14 shows
the same curves as Figure 13 with the addition of the
matched curve for probability 0.6271 from Table 5.
Once we have a binomial probability for the
Hamming distance curve for each sequence, we can
subtract it from 1 and invert this number to find the
number of choices. So the ideal case of a probability of
FIGURE 13: Observed Hamming distances for
participant pairs for Sequence 8 versus the ideal p=0.75
n=1225 Binomial Distribution.
FIGURE 14: Observed Hamming distances for
participant pairs for Sequence 8 with matched binomial
distribution of p=0.6271 and n=1225.
0.75 would become 1/(1 − 0.75) which is 4. By taking
the log to base 2 of the generated number-of-choices
number, we get the number of bits required to represent
this number of choices. By multiplying the number of
bits per choice, which is the number of bits per character
position, by the number of characters in the sequence,
we get the number of bits of security that the human
choices have in the resulting sequence.
This bits-of-security number, which depends on the
security parameter which is the length of the sequence,
is our best number for an approximation for how much
randomness the human choices add to the process. That
is, if the random number generator algorithm for the
underlying four choices presented to the human for
each character position is known, and the seed for the
random number generator also becomes known, this
would mean that the four values presented to the human
The Computer Journal, Vol. ??, No. ??, ????
18 K. Radke, C. Boyd, J. Gonzalez Nieto and H. Bartlett
for each character position are known. Even with the
adversary knowing which four values are presented to
the human for each character position, the adversary
would still have this bits-of-security number, added by
the human, to overcome.
As stated in Section 4, in some instances a CHURN
of only 5 characters may provide the security properties
desired. Therefore, the fitted probabilities for each
of the sequences and the resulting bits of security if
the CHURN is 5 characters and if the CHURN is 20
characters are displayed in Table 5. A summary of the
minimum, maximum, and average values are presented
in Table 6. This will provide useful data for making a
decision regarding the security parameter of how many
characters to have in a CHURN, as this will be the
resulting security if the random number generator and
seed become known to the adversary.
The figures presented in Tables 5 and 6 become
particularly important in the case where the algorithm
for generating the random choices, and critically the
“seed” or “initial value” for that algorithm becomes
known. As discussed in Section 2.2, a random number
provided by a device such as the RSA SecurID token,
requires blind trust on the behalf of the human that the
generated number is random and cannot be predicted
by a malicious party.
In March 2011, a security breach occurred at RSA
which meant that the values presented on SecurID
tokens were predictable. This knowledge was later used
in a breach at Lockheed Martin [24–26].
In contrast, in the case of a CHURN there is a
significant number of combinations that any malicious
entity would need to cater for even if the random
number generator of the device, and the random seed,
became known. This is because a critical element in
the design and construction of a CHURN is the human-
ownership of the constructed random sequence. Thus,
even though the malicious entity may be able to predict
completely which four values, in which four positions,
are presented to a user, the human will still be making
choices from those four values. Tables 5 and 6 tells
us that the minimum number of bits of security from
any of our twenty sequences, when compared across the
1225 comparisons for each of the twenty sequences, was
28.46 bits of security for a sequence of 20 characters.
This means that the malicious entity would still have
effectively 369, 244, 195 possible combinations to select
from, even if the human selection distribution (thus
the reduction from 40 bits of security to 28.46 bits of
security for a 20 character sequence) was known.
6. CONCLUSION
Creating an indication of freshness for use in protocols
which include a human is critical for preventing replay
attacks. While the need for random challenges, nonces,
has long been understood and used in device-to-
device protocols, to-date no such construct exists in
the context of device-to-human protocols. A major
limitation in the past has been the ability for humans to
create random strings that they have ownership of and
can recognise as being theirs. We have filled this gap
with the creation of CHURNs, which can now be used
in protocols involving a human to provide the human
with an assurance of freshness.
Returning to our two hypotheses, we have shown
that sequences created by humans using our CHURN-
generator are significantly more random than sequences
created by humans without the aid of a CHURN-
generator. We have shown there is a significant second
source of randomness due to the human input to a
CHURN-generator via the Hamming distances and how
close the Hamming distances were to a true binomial
distribution. We have provided security values both for
our tested 20 character sequences, and for sequences of
5 characters which would still provide useful security
assurances for many real world scenarios. Finally, more
than two thirds of our participants reported feeling
more in control using the CHURN-generator to create a
random sequence than being given a random sequence
to use by a computer.
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